Good governance and development : what are the perspectives for Africa’s development? by Edoun, Emmanuel Innocents & Ezeanyka, Samuel
1 
 
 
 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: WHAT ARE THE PERSPECTIVES FOR AFRICA’S 
DEVELOPMENT?  
1Emmanuel Innocents EDOUN 
University of Johannesburg 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
2Samuel Ezeanyka 
University of Oweri 
Nigeria 
Abstract 
Governance is always perceived as trustworthy benchmark for good practices in prediction for 
better results through transparency and accountability. This is the reason why Western liberal 
democrats considered good governance as a prerequisite for Africa’s socio-economic 
development. This school of thought inferred that, democracy is the panacea for Africa’s woes and 
precarious socio-economic predicament. On the other hand, the second school of thought 
spearheaded by those who challenge the myth of market liberalism, postulate that socio-economic 
development is an essential conditionality for establishing viable democracy. Their thinking in this 
line is strongly promoted by countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and 
South Africa, where socio-economic development has occurred either under non-democratic or 
outright dictatorial governments. After the institutionalization of their economic development, these 
countries then embarked on a dynamic democratization process. Compromise analysts posit that 
despite the apparent dichotomy between the two views, there is merit in both approaches, because 
there is a positive correlation between democracy, good governance and socio-economic 
development. This group therefore proposes the concurrent institutionalization of both democracy 
and economic growth through a process of adaptation. They recommend that such a process 
should be gradual and inclusive, comprehensive and systematic, taking into cognizance the 
dynamic peculiarities and socio-cultural realities of African countries. This paper critically examines 
these views arising thereof. 
Keywords: Good Governance, Liberal democrats, Socio-economic development, 
Institutionalisation, democratization, dictatorial government. 
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Introduction 
 
There is a resuscitated and ongoing debate – very robust in nature - on the indispensability of 
Western liberal representative democracy to development, particularly among the underdeveloped 
and developing economies of Africa. Opinions, and the literature supporting them, are divided on 
the issue. For some analysts, the institutionalization of liberal representative democracy is a 
precondition for the creation of an enabling environment for the introduction of policies likely to 
lead to the socio-economic development of Africa’s mostly underdeveloped economies. For this 
group therefore, democracy is the panacea for Africa’s woes and precarious socio-economic 
predicament (Skhar, 1979; Carrey, 1993; Elagab, 1993; Dorraj, 1994; Hope, 1997). Others, among 
them some who challenge the myth of market liberalism, maintain that socio-economic 
development is an essential conditionality for the establishment of democracy (Amsden, 1989; 
Wade, 1990; Adedeji, 1990, 1995; Beckman, 1991; Schatz, 1994). Quite a number of them argue 
that this later position is sustained by the observed experience of countries like South Korea, 
Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa (to mention but a few), where socio-economic 
development has occurred either under non-democratic or outright dictatorial governments. After 
the institutionalization of their economic development, these countries then embarked on a 
dynamic democratization process which has reinforced the overall emancipation of the greatest 
majority of their citizenry. Compromise analysts posit that despite the apparent dichotomy between 
the two views, there is merit in both approaches, because there is a positive correlation between 
democracy and socio-economic development. This group therefore proposes their concurrent 
institutionalization, through a process of adaptation. They recommend that such a process should 
be gradual and inclusive, comprehensive and systematic, taking into cognizance the dynamic 
peculiarities and socio-cultural realities of African countries (Olukoshi et. al., 1994; Strydom and 
Fiser, 1995; M’baya, 1995; Ake, 1996; Ezeanyika, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Jega, 2003). 
The concept linking the development of liberal democracy as an instrument of socioeconomic 
development evolved in North America and Europe (particularly among European Union [EU] 
members) in the mid- and late1980s. The conceptualization of this new approach was aided by 
events in the international system such as the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of 
democratic movements from the civil societies of many underdeveloped and developing countries. 
The EU took a fundamental step in its development policy toward developing, but particularly 
underdeveloped economies, when, in November 28, 1991, it adopted the Resolution on Human 
3 
Rights, Democracy and Development. With the traditional approaches to development co-
operation, the argument that political factors may play a decisive role in the creation of 
development opportunities, thus enhancing overall economic performance is currently being 
strongly encouraged and pursued. North American countries and EU members have buried the 
‘aid without conditionality’ era, particularly in Africa. The United States of America (USA) set the 
tune. In the summer of 1992, when he was still a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton outlined his 
views on projected USA policies toward Africa. According to him, “we must reform our aid 
programmes to ensure that the assistance we provide truly benefits Africans and encourages the 
development of democratic institutions and free market economies” (Topic, 1992). 
The EU's approach has been to lay down very stringent political and/or economic conditionalities in 
accordance with the stipulations of the Maastricht Treaty (Diop, 1994:15). The argument that these 
conditionalities are informed by Europe's economic recession in the past few years, and the public 
opinion within EU member countries on the repeated failures of development aid policies does not 
imply that the attachment of demands to aid-giving would ensure the establishment of Western-
types liberal democracies that would in turn ensure socio-economic development in Africa. It is a 
truism that such democratic clauses introduced in a number of important development co-
operation ‘contracts’ between the EU and Latin America prior to the 1990s have not succeeded in 
institutionalising democracy in the region. 
After the brief discussion on liberal democracy and socio-economic development, section 2 of this 
article critically examines the daunting challenges faced by African countries compelled to adopt 
Western models of liberal democracy with their weak economies still undergoing structural 
transformation. Section 3 presents an incisive discussion on the popularisation of multi-partism and 
its symbiotic linkages with socio-economic development and neo-liberalism. It also discusses the 
fallacious assumptions inherent in their wholesome adoption. Section 4 contributes to the ongoing 
debate on the role and impact of the civil society in the contemporary process of democratisation in 
the 21st century. Section 5 presents our concluding remarks. 
 
 
The Challenge of Liberal Democracy in Economies in Structural Transformation 
We want it to be clearly understood that liberal democracy is not synonymous to socio-economic 
development. In other words, the introduction of liberal democratic principles by African emerging 
international elite and their cohorts through constitutions and/or other legal documents does not 
inevitably bring about the socio-economic transformation of a polity. Among many African 
countries, Nigeria under President Shehu Shagari (1979-1993) and President Olusegun Obasanjo 
(1999-2007) are case studies. It is however a truism that it cannot develop in an environment 
where the majority is condemned in a debilitating prison of absolute, acute and disproportionate 
poverty in the midst of the ostentatious few (Ezeanyika, 2006, 2008), or where stringent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed structural adjustment programmes (SAP) are imposed 
on economies undergoing structural transformation. Most of Africa’s underdeveloped countries are 
responding poorly to the twin responsibilities of managing socio-economic and political reforms. 
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Based on Africa’s dependence on foreign aid from the developed economies of the West for its 
development, and the necessity for its countries to establish Western liberal democracies to secure 
and ensure the continuance of development assistance, African countries must face up to the 
challenge of simultaneously managing economic dynamism and the needs of their civil societies. 
The implication is that they have to sustain the economic logic of their SAP in tune with the political 
logic of the democratisation process. 
The adoption of multi-partism does not guarantee the institutionalisation of a statist and 
representative-type of liberal democracy and democratic principles including legitimacy, 
accountability, transparency and civil liberties. It has to be recognised that the introduction of multi-
party constitutions may not in themselves, be enough to sustain ‘new’ democracies in the 21st 
century (Moore, 1993). While national debates and pluralist elections are fundamental steps 
leading toward the creation of an enabling and sustainable democratic environment in Africa, these 
structures need to be reinforced and supported by sound socio-economic reforms and 
development policies, and a myriad of non-state actions and activities involving the civil society 
(Shaw and MacLean, 1996:250). 
 
The initiation, evolution and development of an indigenous political culture, which is people-
inspires and people-oriented, and rooted in their socio-cultural experiences and realities needs to 
be valorised. Though their trado-historic experiences vary, their colonial and post-colonial realities 
constitute their binding cord. Taking Nigeria for instance, the colonial experience is measurably 
similar and the post-colonial misrule is evenly felt across the vast and densely populated country. 
Therefore, no matter the ethnic group that enjoy hegemonic power at a given time, it is the same 
national elite that continue to benefit from the largesse of government while the majority of the 
populace suffers across the divide.  
 
The African inclusive democracy project is, to a very large extent, an internally engineered, 
gradual, and inherently long-term and endogenous process that has to emanate from within local 
and national institutions that will be able to fairly and equitably share power, in a holistic manner, 
for the national management of opportunities and resources. This leads us to pose the following 
questions: How do we allocate power? Who should eventually wield the ultimate power? The 
answers to these important questions are going to inform us about who should be the ultimate 
target of state’s policies? Is it the majority of the people in a given African country? In this case, if 
development, that is, economic, political and socio-cultural, targets the majority, it becomes 
democratic. On the contrary, it is a pretext. The supposed popular empowerment that has 
generally eluded African international elite should be a major focal point in the centre of any 
meaningful discourse on democracy and development.   
 
 
Multi-partism, Socio-economic Development and Neo-liberalism 
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In the majority of the world’s peripheral countries (which includes almost all of those from Africa), 
the wholesome adoption of Western-style models of multi-party democracy and their neo-liberal 
economic policies now dominate the debate on sustainable socio-economic development (Peet 
and Watts, 1993; Slater, 1993; Ake, 1996; Jega, 2000). These models are not new to the African 
continent. European colonial powers, at the last stage of colonisation, fashioned constitutions 
similar to theirs, for the territories they occupied (Young, 1970; Olamola and Ola, 1979; and 
Chuku, 1997). These constitutions, patterned mainly after those of Britain and France, possessed 
the fundamental principles of multi-party democracy (Ake, 1991, 1994; Anyang, ‘Nyongo, 1992; 
Ezeanyika, 2007). The economic policies embraced by the majority of these ‘nominally’ political 
independent African countries had development agenda of export-oriented growth and free market 
capitalism (Myers, 1996). However, Africans’ perceptions of Western democratic ideals and their 
free market economies were diverse and so were their impacts in different states. 
These diverse perceptions and different national impacts in Africa call for insights from previous 
experiences. This approach is fundamental to the understanding of the dynamism of African 
countries’ current structural transformation (Osaghae, 1995: 184). It could therefore be said that 
the current debate on democratisation, sustainable socio-economic development, and neo-
liberalism in Africa is an old debate and the continent has been engaged in it for nearly five 
decades. While the pre-independence experiences of most African territories were patterned to the 
colonial policies of their ‘conquerors’, they were however all principally geared toward 
comprehensive and systematic exploitation, plunder and destruction. Therefore, post-
independence multi-party liberal democracy has affected and has been affected by the socio-
cultural realities in each country. The national political configurations have shaped Africans’ 
reactions to multi-partism, leading to the gradual and progressive emergence of international 
African elite.  
The imposition of Western-style multi-partism and neo-liberalism on African countries is based on 
some fallacious and inconsistent assumptions. It takes for granted the dynamic pluralism of most 
African countries, thus making the wholesome application of these foreign models of political and 
economic development disruptive. There is also the tendency among Western governments and 
scholars to assume that their style of multi-party, statist and representative liberal democracy is a 
superior one and the best political arrangement for all nations, in fact, that it is, ‘the end of history’ 
(Fukuyama, 1992). 
 
There are discernible contradictions in Western governments’ disbursement of development 
assistance. On the one hand, some countries which abide to their model of multi-party elections 
are rewarded with ‘generous’ development aid and held up as exemplary models for other 
countries to follow (Sarnoff, 1987; Hayward, 1987; Bowman, 1991), while on the other hand, these 
same Western governments and their donor agencies also provide generous development aid to 
well-known non-democratic and/or outright dictatorial African governments. 
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Meanwhile, most of those African countries undergoing Western-imposed and sponsored SAPs 
have to bear the brunt of their conditionalities (Mengisteab and Logan, 1993). One of the principal 
conditionalities imposed on the majority of the underdeveloped and developing countries is the 
reduction of the state’s role in the economy, a role which is covertly active in most developed 
economies (Shafaeddin, 1994; Ezeanyika, 1995; 2002). There is sufficient evidence tacitly 
embedded in the national economic policies of the developed nations which encourages 
intervention in the ‘free flow’ of their economies. It is overtly explained as government incentives to 
sustain and spur growth. Empirical examinations of African countries’ political economy show that 
in most of them (if not all), the state’s participation is critical to the overall development (Osaghae, 
1995:190; Ezeanyika, 2006). Strong state’s intervention in Africa’s underdeveloped and developing 
economies is, at this nascent stage of its socio-economic development, inevitable.  
 
National patrimonies like land are fundamental for the actualisation of even development since 
they inhibit the causes of neo-liberal socio-economic development (Reyna and Downs, 1988; 
Berry, 1988). States are therefore responsible for the equitable distribution of land so as to create 
an enabling environment for effective and efficient utilisation. To achieve the desired goal of socio-
economic development, African countries formulate interventionist policies designed to regulate 
and register land acquisition and transfer, even if these are to give way to a privatised land market 
(Ciekawy, 1988; Sevilla, 1995; Mabogunjo, 1995). With the ongoing international campaign for the 
adoption of environmentally friendly socio-economic development policies, Africa’s fragile and 
vulnerable economies are expected to introduce similar ones which should include strategies for 
environmental control (Cocklin and Furuseth, 1994). The contradictions on the one hand, 
expecting African governments to drastically reduce their role in the economy and, on the other 
hand, asking them to ensure equitable land distribution and environmental control - have been the 
bane of aid donors-recipients relations. 
 
The development of sustainable institutions is fundamental to the emergence and growth of 
sustainable democracy, including the liberal democratic ideals and neo-liberalism. The institutions 
preferred by the West are those involving the civil society (Colclough and Mayor, 1991; Bratton 
and Rothchild, 1992; Hyden and Bratton, 1992). Similar institutions have existed in the majority of 
African communities for centuries and they have ensured, to a large extent, rural self-help, 
development and social cohesion (Stride and Ifeka, 1971; Ejiofor, 1982; Ezeanyika, 2007). 
 
The civil society, which includes non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector, 
cannot alone sustain democratic ideals and spur neo-liberal socio-economic development in Africa. 
Government institutions “which produce, transmit and stabilise development ‘truths’ have to be 
involved because they produce the knowledge and practices of democracy and development both 
within the government and in the civil society” (Escabor, 1988; Watts, 1993). 
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It has been observed that the geography of a state’s institutions plays a key role to its operation. 
Therefore, the concept of decentralisation of authority must take into consideration the fact that it 
requires that, of necessity be conceived in spatial terms (Gore, 1984). Such a development will 
enable it meet the people’s needs in their rural communities. This is why Anyang ‘Nyongo’s 
(1992:92) argument that democracy is not about what government do; it is about what the people 
do to make their governments accomplish things for the common good, is not 'idealism run wild' as 
interpreted by Bratton (1992:4). This is a very fundamental principle that has been behind the 
institutionalisation of Western liberal democracies. It is also not naive, as stated by Myers 
(1996:224) to assume that governments at the local level, if given autonomy, are more likely, over 
time, to accomplish things for the common good. Though the performance of local administrators 
has been, in most nascent democracy projects, generally poor, there is still sufficient and 
encouraging evidence from surveys carried out both in Francophone and Anglophone Africa 
(Cameroon, Togo, and Benin with their actualisation of communal government through 
préfectures, arrondissements and départements that are equivalent to the local government and 
county systems of the Anglophone countries like Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana). Using Nigeria as an 
example of an Anglophone country, its experience, since 1976, with the creation of semi-
autonomous local government areas (LGAs) both in non-democratic and in civil rule shows that, in 
the communities where it has had a positive impact, this administrative innovation has, to a very 
large extent, brought government actions and activities to the doorsteps of the rural populace, and 
city dwellers. In the remote rural areas, far away from the state capitals, the devolution of authority 
to the LGA chairpersons and councillors has substantially contributed in the accomplishment of 
activities for the common good. 
Within the LGA context, where those involved in the local governance are members of the local 
constituencies, their actions and activities have been more in tune and geared toward solving 
some of the myriad of socio-economic and other development problems in the concerned rural 
areas. It is particularly in this context that the genuine people-inspired and people-oriented ‘local’ 
civil society has played a two-fold role: keeping the emancipation and the socio-economic 
development of the people in the top agenda of the LGA authorities, and keeping those in 
government (elected or appointed) on their toes.  
 
The state governments are generally perceived as far away authorities despite their proximity to 
the LGAs. In most LGAs in Nigeria, the federal government is almost always absent, and its 
presence is rarely felt, because its actions and activities are too far away from the rural people and 
very few, if any federal presence is felt in the majority of these remote areas. The LGA authority 
therefore becomes the intermediary between the rural people, the states, and the federal 
government. Though the effective utilisation of bounded spaces to regulate social behaviour is 
highly uneven in practice in most African countries, the experimentation of multi-party democracy 
in some of them that is focused on the devolution of state power is gradually bringing it to the 
people, from whom it was hijacked in the first place. The participation of rural people in their own 
governance makes them direct parties to the planning and execution of their socio-economic 
development programmes. The above position is not opposed to Lemarchand’s (1992:181) 
argument that spatial tactics of states involve much more than the delineation of territorial units. It 
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rather reinforces the position that genuinely empowering to the people by making them a party to 
the selection and election processes in their communities ensures that the majority of those in 
position of authority at the third tier (and in other theirs) of government have a socio-cultural 
commitment to their communities. This is most likely to encourage social responsibility, reduce 
conflict and encourage unity and cohesion. 
 
We are not oblivious of the scandalous levels of power abuse that the LGAs system has 
experienced since its inception, particularly in Nigeria. We are therefore, conscious of the fact that 
generalizing the gains of decentralisation is hazardous. This is particularly so because the large 
majority of African countries are still in the democracy project stage of development, where their 
policy-making machinery is just being articulated by their international elite. They have attained 
only the transition from military to civil rule. Most African countries are still grappling with the next 
stage or the second transition, from civil rule to the democratising process. It is at this stage that 
the greatest majority of Africans will begin to enjoy and reap the dividends of the democratisation 
process, made possible by the peoples’ direct appropriation of their power from the international 
elite and its transfer to themselves. 
 
 
The Role of the Civil Society in Africa’s Democracy Project 
 
Africa’s contemporary political economy is quite different from that inherited at the end of 
colonisation and the beginning of neo-colonisation. These changes are as a result of two major 
sets of events: the evolution of national and international economies and the civil societies; and the 
evolution of national policies (Shaw and Maclean, 1996:284). The SAPs have dominated Africa's 
political economy of the 1980s with their neo-liberal conditionalities. These programmes, according 
to Shaw and Maclean (1996) “were simply a formalisation and extension of pre-and post-
independence dependency, the negative effects of which had been initially camouflaged by post-
war growth and post-independence honeymoon.” It is on record that SAPs were introduced in 
Africa during the period through which the Cold War attained its apogee and then collapsed. 
During this same period, the world economy was in recession, thus exacerbating the socio-
economic problems confronting Africa's underdeveloped and developing countries. 
 
Structural adjustment programmes were designed in the 1980s by the Breton Woods institutions - 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank During the second half of the 1980s, 
these programmes were imposed on most African countries, particularly those very dependent on 
and highly desirous of Western development aid. The officially stated objective of these policies 
was to stabilise African economies by reducing the macro-economic mismanagement, particularly 
over-valued exchange rates and high rates of inflation, highly protective trade regimes, 
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government intervention in regulating markets and controlling prices, and heavy direct taxation of 
agriculture, over extended roles for public enterprises, and government control and intervention in 
the operation of financial institutions (World Bank, 1994:3). The initial focus of SAPs, that is, on 
economic policies and terms of trade has, since the early 1990s included other conditionalities 
such as political, ecological and military elements, and others such as democratic institutions and 
multi-party elections, and increased environmental) and decreased strategic expenditures (Shaw 
and Maclean, 1996: 248). The whole agenda for the proposed reforms reflect Western concepts of 
democratic and neo-liberal hegemony. 
 
Even the World Bank acknowledges that SAPs have negative effects on the majority of those 
groups in absolute, acute and disproportionate poverty, even in those African countries that have 
sustained major reform policies. Lipumba (1995:45) notes that “policies do not go far enough, even 
in those countries that are doing the best job of reforming are not achieving the growth rates that 
can significantly reduce poverty in the medium terms.” The bottom line is therefore that “with 
today’s poor policies, it will be forty years before the region returns to its per capita income of the 
mid-1970s” (World Bank, 1994: 36). The adverse effects of SAPs are also affecting the middle and 
upper classes of the African society. In the words of Shaw and Maclean (1996:249) “they have 
been affected negatively albeit belatedly as:  
 
1. Their real incomes have declined precipitously, especially in terms of foreign exchange; 
 
2. Costs of goods and services have escalated as inflation and user fees have risen.”  
 
The group’s decline in prosperity has profound implications for development as well as for 
democracy. Without a strong middle class, sustainable democracy is unlikely. Therefore, the 
assumption that SAPs would ultimately contribute to the emergence of thriving middle classes 
throughout the continent involves a fallacy of social composition which parallels the economic 
fallacy that unlimited opportunity for diversification and expansion of exports exists even when 
most underdeveloped and developing countries are subject to similar SAPs conditionalities. 
Two decades after the 1960s, the majority of African countries had regained nominal political 
independence from their former colonisers, adopting either the liberal democratic ideal or the 
socialis one, corresponding to the prevailing bipolarity of the international system (Ezeanyika, 
1999). In spite of the favourable economic conditions of the 1970s, most states had adopted the 
one-party system and their leaders had entrenched their interventionist power either through the 
perpetuation of the one-party state controlled by the pre-colonial nationalists or through coup 
d’état, characterised by a high degree of power centralisation (Ezeanyika, 2007). These non-
democratic governments were neither developmental nor democratic and the majority placed 
several obstacles to the participation of the civil society as well as private capital. According to 
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Shaw and Maclean (1996.), “such concentration (of power) was excused as a necessary reaction 
to previously exclusive colonial or settler orders in a Cold War era in which large parts of the world 
enjoyed state communist government.” 
 
Notions of inclusive democratic development or human rights were rejected as mere Western 
attempts to maintain economic influence and strategic balance. The majority of these African 
dictatorial regimes continued to perpetuate political continuity through their tight control of the 
state’s political machinery, but they failed to maintain continuity in the national economic prosperity 
of the 1970s into the next decade. The relative economic prosperity of the early 1960s reinforced 
the prevailing neo-liberal notions of socio-economic development anchored on free trade, 
international assistance and exchange. This artificial growth not linked to a sustainable 
industrialisation policy and industrial production base encouraged excessive borrowing which 
subsequently led to the ‘shocks’ of the 1970s and the debt ‘crisis’ of the 1980s.This made Africa’s 
underdeveloped economies overtly vulnerable to Western hegemonic neo-liberal dependence. 
 
The predominance of neo-liberal ideals of socio-economic development changed the nature of the 
development debate (Moore and Schmitz, 1995), with a transition from acceptance of state 
participatory role in the economy to that of ‘non-interventionist observer’ (Nyang'oro, 1993). As in 
the period characterised as the ‘drive toward independence,’ the active participation of the civil 
society expanded in scope (Ezeanyika, 2007). Thus, by the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of 
African countries, however reluctant first, were compelled to embrace economic and political 
liberalisation, whether they were compatible or not with the dynamic realities of their pluralism 
since these were the imposed conditionalities prescribed by the industrialised economies which 
were providing them with development aid. 
 
Walzer (1991) defined civil society as the “space of un-coerced human association and also the 
set of rational networks - formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology - that fill this 
space.” According to Shaw and Maclean (1996), “civil society is comprised of the various non 
governmental organisations, human rights groups, co-operatives, unions, media, religious 
assemblages, professional associations, and so on, through which individuals collectively and 
voluntarily carries out their social enterprises.” In a nutshell, the civil society is composed of all 
reciprocity-based organisations not established by the state (national and international) which are 
concerned with and engaged in the betterment of man’s life in society. It is therefore 
understandable that, from their very nature, these groups often exist in dynamic tension with the 
state.  
There are several perceptions of the civil society. Three are discussed in this article. Liberal 
analysts perceive the civil society as being distinct from and opposed to the state. Following this 
viewpoint, the authority over all within its space mediates among competing and sometimes 
conflicting interests in the civil society, while the latter, protected by the rule of law (where it exists), 
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collectively acts as a check to balance the pervasive power of the state. Marxist analysts perceive 
the civil society as a product of the bourgeoisie developed through the social organisation evolving 
out of production and intercourse, which in all ages, forms the basis of the state and the rest of the 
idealistic superstructure. From this analysis, the state is perceived as being subordinate to the civil 
society that is in control of economic relations. The Gramscian analysts accept the Marxists’ 
perception of the primacy of a materialistic base but they place the civil society in the 
superstructure along with the state and include ideology with economies as primary forces 
(Carnoy, 1984:65-68). 
 
The Gramscian analysts’ concept of hegemony, which sees a distinction between the notion of civil 
society from both liberal and Marxist analysts is quite instructive in understanding post-
independence state - societal relations, particularly in Africa. Since the leadership of the dominant 
class (principally composed of the international elite, composed of politicians, the commercial 
bourgeoisie, and the traditional rulers) over the subordinate one was by consent rather than 
coercion, the hegemonic control of the state and its space was based on the unifying slogans of 
nationalism and developmentalism which turned out to be unsustainable and short-lived. Because 
of the weak economies of the African countries, their dictatorial one-party regimes could not 
completely emasculate dissenting voices. The above scenario looks like a Gramscian ‘crisis of 
authority’ in which the dominant class is unable to spur the development of cohesion and maintain 
social consensus because the state economy in their control is weak. The civil society can 
therefore be only coercively controlled.  
 
The above scenario notwithstanding, the dictatorship of the African countries’ dominant class, the 
international elite, did not obliterate indigenous institutions of their civil societies despite incessant 
harassment, imprisonment, and the killing of their leaders and prominent members. The spectres 
created by the presence of absolute, acute and disproportionate poverty, marginalisation, and 
ethnic particularism, and the international waves of globalisation and democracy (as if they are 
mutually exclusive) have all combined to power a new drive in the development and proliferation of 
NGOs with national and some international ramifications. 
 
The inter-phase of NGOs that are national but with international connections were generally 
classified by Korten (1990).  In general, NGOs are distinguished not only by their normative 
commitments and functional operations, but also by the nature of their relations with others in both 
national and international environments. By implication of the above argument, NGOs may exist 
through an “engagement between the state and society which may be congruent as well as 
conflictual” (Bratton, 1989:418). African countries’ reactions to these NGOs have varied from 
toleration and support, to outright oppression, co-option, control or repression. The type of 
government in power at a given time has generally influenced the intensity of the reactions. Military 
juntas and one-party dictatorial regimes have been most repressive and thus have produced more 
dynamic and militant NGOs. 
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In reaction to the proliferation of NGOs generally antagonistic to the state classifications), African 
governments have set up rival structures. Fowler (1992) referred to them as governmental-non 
governmental organisations (GONGOs). They are also referred to as quasi-NGOs (QUANGOs). A 
good example is the Family Support Programme (FSP) formed by the dictatorial regime of late 
Abacha of Nigeria which continued to function within the civil rule of president Obasanjo. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Starting from the colonial period through the early years of nominal political independence, and till 
date, Western governments have adopted multifarious strategies targeted at subverting the 
genuine independence and socio-economic development of African countries. Among other 
tactics, these strategies have been particularly expressed through SAPs and the conditionalities 
attached to both public and private official development assistance (ODA). As a result, SAPs and 
the funds provided by Western governments and their NGOs, purportedly to maintain a 
democratising and developmentalist role in African countries’ policies and political agenda for 
socio-economic development have not achieved that goal. This we believe is because they were 
not intended to achieve a positive goal. Many reasons could be advanced to support this position. 
The most central one, in our view, is the deliberate timing of SAPs and new ODA conditionalities to 
coincide with the collapse of communism, recession in Europe and the emergence of globalisation. 
It has now become generally accepted that democracy and socio-economic development are 
essential for alleviating absolute, acute and disproportionate poverty. They can also create a 
sustainable environment for the improvement of Africans’ living standard. To attain this goal of a 
genuine partnership between the industrialised economies of the West and the underdeveloped 
and developing countries of Africa, the expectations, demands and support of the industrialised 
economies need to accommodate the dynamic realities of Africa’s pluralism, its nascent 
institutions, and the need to allow her determine the degree of adaptation suitable to its 
development needs. On the other hand, African governments and their civil societies have to 
seriously address the underlying problems obstructing the development of stable democratic 
governments and sustainable economies. The adaptation of western liberal democratic ideals 
could lead to social cohesion, the introduction of functioning institutions and a dynamic African 
form of government that is inclusive of all strata in the society, based on a consensus-building and 
decision-making process. 
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